Back to Essays

Essay

What Outlasts America First

Three clocks, the cost of independence, and the international order of 2030–2040

Author
Arthur Palmer
Published

Two Days in October

On October 7, 2026, Marco Rubio spoke from the Pnyx in Athens, where citizens of the ancient city had once assembled beneath the Acropolis. The American secretary of state invoked Greece, Rome, and the inheritance of Western civilization while urging Europe and the United States to renew their national confidence, industrial ambition, and military strength. The setting was deliberate: American officials had sought the venue, Greece had accommodated them, and the U.S. Embassy assembled an invited audience. American reporting noted the presentation's presidential overtones. Greece, meanwhile, had every reason to cultivate an American official whose influence might extend beyond the present administration.1

Two days later, European Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič announced preliminary understandings with China in Beijing. The talks concerned proposed limits on Chinese hybrid-vehicle exports to Europe, improved access for certain European goods to China's market, and licensing of rare earths and permanent magnets. The vehicle arrangement could reduce projected Chinese exports by more than half over four years; its detailed implementation remained unresolved. This was a commercial negotiation, not Europe's strategic transfer of allegiance.2

Athens and Beijing revealed the different terms on which Europe deals with the world’s great powers. Greece was cultivating an essential security partner; Brussels was negotiating with an essential economic competitor. European governments could adjust their diplomatic posture in days. They could not as quickly rebuild the security, industrial, and energy systems around which decades of policy had organized their choices.

That difference in speed is the starting point for understanding what may survive America First. An American administration can alter tariffs, security expectations, and alliance obligations within an electoral cycle. Its partners can discover just as quickly that a commitment they had treated as dependable is politically reversible. Recognizing vulnerability, however, is not the same as escaping it.

The lasting structural consequence of a credibility shock depends on whether the affected country can build a usable alternative, at sustainable cost, within the political and strategic constraints imposed by its own history and by the original guarantor. Where substitutes reach operational scale, the shock may leave a new capacity for independent action. Where they cannot, it may leave more bargaining, more payments, and more anxiety inside essentially unchanged alliances. By 2040, the consequences will depend on which capabilities each country can replace, which it can maintain, and which it still needs others to provide.

The Order That Made Dependence Rational

American leadership after 1945 consisted of more than American power alone. Reconstruction, security guarantees, a deep financial system, and institutions supporting trade made it attractive for other countries to organize their own development around an American-centered order. Germany invested in manufacturing within NATO's protection. Japan built an advanced industrial economy while relying on American extended deterrence and maritime power. South Korea combined domestic education, entrepreneurship, and industrial policy with a security relationship sustained under continuing military pressure. These countries created their own achievements; credible American support helped determine the activities on which they could concentrate resources.

The United States benefited too. Military access, diplomatic partners, export markets, research networks, and dollar-centered finance extended the reach of its national capabilities. Over decades, arrangements originally negotiated by governments hardened into technical standards, budget expectations, military doctrine, supply chains, and political habits. A country could become highly productive in civilian industry without acquiring an equally developed capacity to act independently in every strategic domain.

The international liberalization of production and finance from the 1980s increased opportunities for specialization while making the distribution of gains more contentious. Some American workers and communities bore large adjustment costs; some allied governments could allocate more resources to civilian priorities because another state supplied expensive collective defense. As Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser argued in 1966, alliance defense has important public-good characteristics, giving smaller partners incentives to rely disproportionately on larger contributors. Such an arrangement can produce mutual gains and need not be inefficient. It also creates an uneven distribution of the ability to function without the provider.3

As disputes over the costs and benefits of these arrangements enter domestic politics, electoral pressure can move much faster than the institutions built under earlier bargains. America First reflects those contested costs while introducing new uncertainty for governments that planned around relatively continuous American commitments.

The Three Clocks—and the Decision to Hedge

The political clock, commonly two to four years, governs elections, policy reversals, threats, and assurances. The institutional clock, roughly five to fifteen years, governs procurement systems, factories, training, command arrangements, energy facilities, and their integration into working organizations. The structural clock, extending over decades, comprises industrial competence, fiscal capacity, geography, demographics, national authority, and the dependencies inherited from earlier policy. It is not immutable. It was itself formed by prior rounds of political and institutional decisions, often made under stable expectations.

The clocks interact through a country’s exposure to disrupted external support. For any capability—nuclear protection, maritime security, aircraft maintenance, or energy supply—that exposure depends on the probability that a provider will be unable or unwilling to deliver when needed and the loss given the substitutes already available. In simplified terms: probability of disruption × loss with existing substitutes.

A public American reversal can change that probability overnight. Reassurances may later restore confidence, but other governments have learned that an apparently stable commitment can be reversed. Their demand for insurance can rise before any alternative capability exists.

Building a hedge is harder. Over its expected life, the loss it could avert, together with any civilian or strategic benefits, must justify construction, operation, renewal, and political maintenance. The project must also reach usable scale. Incompatible systems, an ammunition plant without repeat orders, or a command center dependent on external data may consume substantial resources without changing what a government can do. Nor does the ally decide alone. Washington may share technology and welcome burden-sharing, or restrict sensitive components, oppose an independent nuclear option, and reconsider its own commitment if an ally develops a replacement. Treaty obligations and regional threats also shape the available choices.

Once an alternative becomes operational, the incentives can change. Trained personnel, repeat customers, suppliers, political constituencies, and complementary investments make continued use more attractive than dismantling it. To outlast its founding crisis, a hedge needs operational scale, decision-making authority, a domestic constituency, and affordable upkeep. The initial appropriation alone cannot secure any of them.

The relevant unit is therefore the capability, rather than a country described as simply dependent or independent. Regions still matter: geography, threats, inherited industry, and political authority determine which substitutes are possible. The distinctions are visible across five capability layers:

Capability layer Scope for substitution Principal barrier and decision authority What would demonstrate persistence
Conventional munitions, maintenance, and selected platforms Relatively high where industry and demand exist Coordinated orders, scale, interoperability, technical access; national and joint procurement authorities Repeat production, usable inventories, independent repair and modification
Intelligence and integrated military command Partial, with substantial network dependencies Shared data, communications, command legitimacy, and allied cooperation Exercises and operations conducted under functioning independent or joint command
Extended nuclear deterrence Europe has French and British weapons, but no automatic common European guarantee; East Asian U.S. allies lack national arsenals Political control, escalation credibility, immense cost, nonproliferation constraints, U.S. response Credible authority to make and implement deterrence decisions, not merely possession of technology
Long-range maritime security Partial regional alternatives; expensive global replacement Fleet scale, basing, logistics, access agreements and U.S. cooperation Sustained protection of routes without indispensable external enablers
Energy and transport resilience Often substantial, but infrastructure-intensive Construction time, fuel mix, geography, finance, public consent Storage, diversified supply and reliable alternative generation or routes in actual use

For initiatives launched in 2026, the five-to-fifteen-year institutional clock points toward 2031–2041. Some projects already underway will mature earlier; others will fail or extend beyond 2040. By then, the important question is not whether dependence has disappeared, but which alternatives have become durable enough to alter national choices.

When a Shock Becomes a Capability

France had been developing nuclear weapons before the 1956 Suez crisis. It conducted its first nuclear test in February 1960, and its airborne deterrent went on alert in October 1964. Two years later, Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated military command, while retaining alliance membership and collective-defense obligations.4 France already possessed a working national deterrent and the political authority to command it. Those capabilities made independent action more credible. U.S. archival records show, moreover, that Washington had conditioned significant nuclear assistance on French strategic forces being committed to NATO.5

Japan's response to the Nixon shocks of 1971 took a different form. Washington's opening to Beijing, announced without the consultation Tokyo had expected, unsettled the Japanese government. Nixon's monetary and trade measures further disrupted Japan's calculations. Tokyo adjusted economic policy and normalized relations with Beijing in 1972, but did not attempt to replace American nuclear or maritime protection. Diplomatic and commercial adjustment could proceed without a comparable transformation in security.6

South Korea and Taiwan confronted the security question more directly. South Korean president Park Chung-hee pursued a nuclear option in the early 1970s amid worries about U.S. troop withdrawals and the reliability of American protection. In 1975 U.S. officials moved to prevent Seoul from buying a French reprocessing plant, warning that proceeding could jeopardize peaceful nuclear cooperation and financial support. The project was constrained before it could become an independent deterrent.7 Taiwan's authorities likewise explored a nuclear option after China's first nuclear test and subsequent changes in U.S.–China relations. Declassified records document sustained American demands in 1976–1978 to curtail sensitive research, with further intervention and the closure of suspect facilities in 1988.8

Concern about American reliability could thus encourage a search for alternatives, while Washington retained the means to constrain them through technology, finance, security cooperation, and nonproliferation policy. Proliferation risks and regional security were genuine considerations, alongside the implications for American influence. The cases show that the provider of a guarantee also helps determine which substitutes can emerge.

Europe: Buying Capability Is Not Buying Authority

Europe's search for greater discretion arises from forces larger than America First: Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the loss of much Russian pipeline gas, aging populations, fiscal pressures, and defense industries divided among national procurement systems. Economic integration has not produced a single European treasury, military command, or authority empowered to decide on nuclear escalation. These accumulated conditions set the third-clock limits on what new defense expenditure can accomplish.

Yet Europe is not identical to East Asia at the nuclear layer. France and Britain possess nuclear forces under national launch authority, although the British Trident missile system depends on American manufacture and maintenance. Europe's unresolved problem is whether nationally controlled forces can provide credible extended protection for other European states, on what terms, and under whose political authority. In March 2026, France and Germany declared that closer nuclear cooperation would complement, not replace, NATO deterrence. President Macron also reserved the ultimate decision to use French nuclear weapons to the French presidency. The obstacle is political authority and credible assurance, not the absence of European nuclear technology.9

For conventional equipment the substitution problem is different and more tractable. The EU's SAFE instrument, established in 2025, offers up to €150 billion in loans for qualifying procurement; sourcing and design-control rules seek to support European industrial capacity. Its conditions are incentives, not proof that new productive capacity exists. The European Defence Readiness Roadmap sets a milestone of at least 40 percent joint procurement by the end of 2027.10

Joint procurement remains limited: EU documents reported a collaborative equipment-procurement share of 18 percent in 2022, and the European Defence Agency reported 24 percent in 2025. Coverage and reporting differences prevent a clean trend comparison.11

What would distinguish successful adjustment is therefore not a rising budget alone. It is whether more procurement is actually shared, whether contracts create production runs large enough to lower cost, whether European operators control repair, software modification, and spare parts, and whether forces can act through functioning commands. These indicators separate three very different developments: an affordable substitute that gives Europe discretion; a complementary capability that makes NATO stronger without reducing dependence at the strategic core; or fragmented investment that raises expenditure without creating usable alternatives.

The political clock imposes a further constraint. Governments must defend higher military and energy costs to electorates before new systems have proved their worth. If political coalitions fail before factories, commands, and training arrangements reach scale, the hedge may never mature. Europe may obtain a more balanced alliance; it may also pay substantially more while still relying on Washington for the decisions that matter most.

East Asia: When Hedging Runs Into a Strategic Ceiling

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have substantial industrial and technological capabilities, but their security problems are shaped by regional military threats, seaborne trade, energy imports, and the need for long-range intelligence and deterrence. Their industries compete with firms in both the United States and China. That economic rivalry is compatible with a security relationship in which the American nuclear guarantee, maritime reach, logistics, and intelligence infrastructure remain extraordinarily difficult to replace. A new missile battery or shipyard may strengthen a partner's conventional position without giving it an independent answer to nuclear coercion.

Japan preserved its security alliance while changing economic and diplomatic policy. South Korea and Taiwan explored more consequential military alternatives, only to encounter sustained American opposition. In each case, the feasibility of a substitute depended on more than engineering and expenditure. American policy could increase the desire for insurance while restricting the means of obtaining it.

The clocks therefore pull in different directions. Political reversals raise doubts about American protection; institutional investment strengthens conventional forces, industrial resilience, and diplomatic bargaining; but the cost and political obstacles of independent nuclear deterrence and long-range maritime protection remain formidable. If regional threats intensify, the cost of losing protection may rise faster than alternative capabilities develop. A country may consequently become less confident in Washington and more dependent on its continued presence at the same time.

The details will differ. Japan and South Korea exercise national authority over substantial conventional forces and industries. Taiwan's security and diplomatic circumstances are distinct, and Taiwan is not an American treaty ally. The status of Taiwan remains a consequential uncertainty: prolonged ambiguity, a mutually accepted peaceful settlement, and coercive change would generate different security incentives. None permits the inference that any resolution automatically eliminates the value of American maritime power or the concern about North Korea. Japan and the United States reaffirmed their extended-deterrence dialogue in June 2026, an example of allies working to stabilize expectations while those broader constraints persist.12

The Middle East: Which Hedge Gets Funded?

As of October 11, 2026, the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, together with severe disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, is disturbing energy supply, shipping, and perceptions of transport risk. The duration is uncertain. Iran's enriched material and unresolved inspection questions must also be distinguished from verified possession of a nuclear weapon; the latter would create a substantially different strategic environment if it occurred.13

The immediate effect on the three clocks is often adverse. Shipping, insurance, and fuel prices can change in days. Governments may redirect money toward emergency energy purchases and household relief; businesses may shorten investment horizons. A shock that raises the cost of industrial inputs can delay defense procurement and reduce the fiscal resources needed to maintain alternative military systems. In this channel the Middle East crowds out security hedges elsewhere.

But an energy shock can also accelerate an energy hedge—and history provides an unusually clear case. The 1973 oil crisis helped bring about the International Energy Agency in 1974 and the system of emergency stocks, now requiring members to hold the equivalent of at least ninety days of net oil imports. In France, the crisis helped trigger the Messmer nuclear program. Électricité de France records that 56 reactors were built between 1974 and 1989. The policy required enormous fixed investment and sustained political commitment, but operating plants, trained personnel, and a national industrial system established an electricity-supply capacity that outlasted the original oil emergency by decades.14 Nuclear generation did not eliminate French dependence on imported energy, especially for transport; it changed the mix and resilience of electricity production.

An energy disruption can therefore shorten fiscal horizons for some projects while raising the value of others. Whether storage, alternative generation, transport routes, or military equipment succeeds depends on usable scale and the fiscal and political capacity to complete and sustain investment. Countries with diverse energy infrastructure and credible public finance can respond differently from those already facing industrial decline or heavy debt.

The Middle East is therefore more than an exogenous interruption of Europe's and East Asia's plans. It changes the relative returns to competing hedges. By 2040 a prolonged energy crisis could leave Europe or East Asia with stronger energy systems but postponed defense autonomy; it could equally leave them with higher prices and unfinished projects in both areas. The model gives us a reason to look for that divergence rather than assuming every shock merely weakens the institutional clock.

What the World of 2040 Would Reveal

By the mid-2030s, announcements will matter less than working institutions. The tests will be whether procurement creates repeat production, whether forces can operate under credible command, whether alternative energy systems carry real demand, and whether governments can make consequential decisions without approvals or assistance they previously required. Washington's willingness to support, absorb, or obstruct these adjustments will remain part of the outcome.

The regional evidence points to three different directions for the 2030s. Europe has scope to gain discretion in conventional procurement, maintenance, and some command functions if joint orders yield affordable production and political coordination holds. Strategic independence is harder: French and British nuclear forces exist, but no common European authority can automatically extend their protection to the continent. East Asian partners can strengthen domestic industry, conventional defense, and diplomatic bargaining while still relying on American extended deterrence, maritime reach, and intelligence. In an acute security crisis, their need for these capabilities could increase even as confidence in Washington falls. Energy substitution may advance more quickly than strategic military substitution, because storage, diversified supply, and new generating capacity have clearer operational thresholds. Yet an energy shock can also redirect the funds that defense projects need. These are conditional directions, shaped by public finance, political consent, and the guarantor's response, rather than a uniform movement toward independence.

These outcomes need not follow a single geopolitical direction. A more capable ally may contribute more effectively to shared defense, while an independent strategic option may cause Washington to reconsider the protection it offers. America First could lead to a more sustainable sharing of burdens, or to higher expenditure and continued dependence on commitments that allies no longer regard as secure.

The Athens of Rubio's speech offers a final historical reminder. Thucydides attributed to Pericles a warning that the city’s power had brought obligations and dangers it could no longer easily set aside. Modern alliances are not ancient empires, but enduring commitments can constrain both sides. Protected states build institutions around the expected guarantee; the guarantor builds its global presence around bases, cooperation, and others' willingness to participate. Renegotiation changes each side's options.15

Political decisions can change credibility immediately. Investments begun now may become working institutions during the 2030s, but geography, finance, industrial competence, and strategic authority determine which endure—and are themselves reshaped by those that do. What outlasts America First is not every hedge it inspires or every doubt it raises, but the capabilities, constraints, and bargaining relationships that become economically and politically sustainable. The international order of 2040 will emerge from these uneven adjustments, not from a synchronized departure from American leadership.

Sources and Notes

  1. Reuters, “Rubio, in Athens, ties ancient values to 'America First'”, October 7, 2026; Associated Press, report on the Pnyx address; Greek Prime Minister's Office, Rubio–Mitsotakis meeting. The presidential interpretation is contemporary commentary, not an announced candidacy. ↩
  2. Reuters, EU–China hybrid-vehicle understanding, October 9, 2026; Associated Press, interim arrangements. The comparison is to projected imports, not observed shipments. ↩
  3. Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (1966), 266–279. Efficient specialization and burdensome dependence can coexist. ↩
  4. U.S. Department of State, 1960 assessment of France's nuclear program; NATO, “France and NATO”; French Ministry of the Armed Forces, 1964 airborne deterrence. These sources distinguish program origins, operation, and the 1966 decision. ↩
  5. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, memorandum on France and nuclear assistance, discussing American policy conditional on the French deterrent's relationship to NATO. ↩
  6. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook 1971 and Diplomatic Bluebook 1972; U.S. Department of State, contemporary assessment of the China announcement's impact on Japan; Japan–China Joint Communiqué, 1972. The 1971 shocks concerned consultation and economic policy, not a direct threat to withdraw U.S. strategic protection. ↩
  7. U.S. Department of State, July 1975 memorandum on South Korea's nuclear-reprocessing plans; National Security Archive, 1975 embassy telegram and historical context. The records document American diplomatic pressure and the threat to civil nuclear cooperation. ↩
  8. National Security Archive, U.S. opposition to Taiwanese nuclear weapons work, 1976–1980 and Taiwan's nuclear program through 1988. Taiwan's relationship to Washington was not a formal mutual-defense treaty after 1979. ↩
  9. Élysée, Macron–Merz declaration, and Macron's Île Longue address, March 2, 2026; NATO, France and NATO. Britain and France possess nationally controlled nuclear forces; the UK's Trident system relies on U.S. missile support, as detailed in the UK Defence Nuclear Enterprise 2026 update. A shared European nuclear guarantee would require separate political arrangements. ↩
  10. Council of the European Union, SAFE procurement instrument and Regulation (EU) 2025/1106; European Commission, Readiness Roadmap 2030. The 40% figure is a goal for end-2027, not a measured 2026 share. ↩
  11. European Commission, European Defence Industrial Strategy, 2024 (18% collaborative procurement in 2022, and the foreign-sourcing estimate); European Defence Agency, Defence Data 2025–2026 release (24% reported for 2025); European Commission, April 2026 answer on incomplete collaborative data; International Institute for Strategic Studies, critique of the 78% estimate's coverage. A much-cited estimate that 78% of orders placed from the invasion to mid-2023 went to non-EU suppliers has been challenged for excluding domestic purchases; it is not a reliable baseline for a procurement trend. ↩
  12. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan–U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue, June 10, 2026. ↩
  13. Reuters, Iran–U.S. dispute over Hormuz reopening, October 11, 2026; Reuters, Iran's enrichment status, October 7, 2026. Nuclear material is not equivalent to a confirmed nuclear weapon. ↩
  14. International Energy Agency, “Oil Security Policy”, on its founding after the 1973 crisis and stockholding obligations; Électricité de France, EDF history, 1973–1990, on the Messmer program and 56 reactors built from 1974 to 1989. ↩
  15. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, II.63, Charles Foster Smith translation. The analogy concerns reciprocal constraint, not an equivalence between alliances and empire. ↩

Methodological note: The three clocks describe a conditional causal process, not an estimated forecast. The exposure expression is a decision aid, not a measured probability for any country. Changes in nuclear deterrence, supplier capacity, and energy security may have causes independent of America First. The historical cases identify mechanisms and limits; they do not isolate the causal effect of any one administration. Contemporary evidence is considered through October 11, 2026.